Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 49 | Number 4

Article 1

1-1-2009

Santa Clara Law Review
Jeffrey Rosen

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Jeffrey Rosen, Symposium, Santa Clara Law Review, 49 Santa Clara L. Rev. 929 (2009).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol49/iss4/1

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Santa Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.

KEYNOTE ADDRESS
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW SYMPOSIUM: BIG
BUSINESS AND THE ROBERTS COURT
Jeffrey Rosen*
It's a pleasure to be here, and thank you so much for
inviting me to talk about the Roberts Court and Big Business.
You were kind enough to invite me, as Bradley Joondeph
mentioned, because of an article I wrote about the Supreme
Court and business interests called Supreme Court Inc.,'
which was a follow-up to an earlier article about the Supreme
Court and libertarian conservatives called The Unregulated
Offensive.2 Both pieces provoked energetic responses-some
of them encouraging, some of them skeptical.
So I'm
delighted to come to this distinguished law school to learn
that at least one of the arguments was right after all. Many
of the statistics discussed in the symposium demonstrate that
the Roberts Court, broadly speaking, does have a generally
pro-business orientation, and has largely disappointed at the
same time the ambition of some libertarian and originalist
conservatives who had hoped that it would take its revolution
even further, and strike down regulations at the core of the
post-New Deal regulatory state.
In thinking further about the relationship between the
two strands of the conservative legal movement over the past
thirty years, I've come to realize that the pro-business and
libertarian conservatives are in more significant tension with
each other than I had initially understood. Over the past
thirty years, there has been a significant fissure between
libertarian conservatives, represented by think-tanks like the
* Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School.

1. Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court, Inc., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2008, § MM
(Magazine), at 38.
2. Jeffrey Rosen, The Unregulated Offensive, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17 2005, § 6
(Magazine), at 42.
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Cato Institute and the Institute for Justice, and pro-business
conservatives, represented by the Chamber of Commerce's
National Chamber Litigation Center. Despite their shared
commitment to free markets and deregulation, the
libertarians and the pro-business conservatives have very
different goals and strategies.
Libertarian conservatives
want to limit federal power to protect states' rights; probusiness conservatives are willing to extend federal doctrines
like preemption to protect the national uniformity that
business interests prefer.
Libertarian conservatives unapologetically embrace
Constitutional judicial activism and arguments about the
original understanding of the constitutional text; pro-business
conservatives are more interested in using statutory
arguments to check what they call "regulation by litigation."3
Libertarians think pro-business conservatives are more
interested in promoting corporate business interests than in a
principled commitment to limited government; pro-business
conservatives respond that being conservative doesn't always
mean being pro-business.
The ideological distance between libertarian and probusiness conservatives can be measured by their very
different responses to the recent economic bailout, including
the Troubled Asset Relief Program ("TARP"),4 and the
stimulus package. 5 Unlike the libertarians, the Chamber of
Commerce isn't ideologically opposed to the economic bailout.
In January, the Chamber wrote to Congress that it "strongly
supported" the broad outlines of TARP and the stimulus bill,
although it has expressed concern about some of the lobbying
restrictions on TARP recipients.6 TARP relies on centralized
regulatory bodies to promote economic well-being and
corporate responsibility, rather than relying on regulation by

3. See generally ANDREW MORRISS ET AL., REGULATION BY LITIGATION

(2008); REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002).
4. See 12 U.S.C.S. §§ 5211-41 (LexisNexis 2009). The TARP was enacted
as part of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, in response to the
sub-prime mortgage crisis and ensuing economic recession.
5. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 1115, 123 Stat. 115 (2009).
6. Letter from R. Bruce Josten, Executive Vice President of Gov't Affairs,
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, to the Members of the
United States Congress (Jan. 6, 2008), availableat http://www.uschamber.com/
assets/sab/090106_EconomicStimulusCongress.pdf.
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litigation-both features that arguably advance the
Chamber's mission to promote "the unified interests of
American business."
The libertarians, by contrast, have already pledged to
challenge the bailout in court. In January, Freedom Works,
an organization chaired by former Republican House majority
leader Dick Armey and founded in 1984 to promote "lower
government, less taxes, and more freedom,"' declared that
Congress has unconstitutionally delegated lawmaking power
to the president.9 Freedom Works plans to file a lawsuit
alleging that the TARP violates the "non-delegation doctrine,"
recognized in cases before the New Deal, which holds that
Congress can't delegate legislative authority to the executive
branch without "intelligible principle[s]" to guide its
discretion. 1°
The Freedom Works lawsuit on the horizon is hardly the
only potential libertarian challenge to the TARP, the stimulus
bill, and other government bailouts. According to Laurence
Tribe of Harvard Law School, there are a number of possible
avenues for constitutional challenges to the bailouts, even
beyond the excessive delegation challenges that may multiply
as the original plan to buy troubled assets has morphed into a
plan to treat auto companies as financial institutions. 1 Tribe
predicts that libertarians may claim that TARP violates the
constitutional requirement that taxing measures must
originate in the House rather than the Senate; question some
of the appointment
procedures
for
the Recovery
Accountability and Transparency Board (the "RAT Board"),
which is responsible for preventing fraud and abuse; argue
that states can't be forced to change their unemployment laws
as a condition of accepting bailout funds; and challenge home
foreclosure provisions of the stimulus bill as unconstitutional
7. See 12 U.S.C.S. § 5214 (LexisNexis 2009) (establishing a Financial

Stability Oversight Board within the Treasury Dept. to oversee the
administration of the TARP).
8. John Schwartz, Some Ask if Bailout Is Unconstitutional, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 15, 2009, at A16.
9. See, e.g., Matt Kibbe, The Unconstitutional Bailout, POLITICo, Feb. 2,
2009, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0209/18265.htmi.
Matt Kibbe is
President of the Freedom Works Foundation.
10. Schwartz, supra note 8.
11. Jeffrey Rosen, TARP Heels, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 18, 2009,
http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=e4d5f35c-98c4-4427-9db6-b55eb99636
b9.
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seizure of property without just compensation. 12
The libertarian lawsuits seem to vindicate the fears of
liberals who have charged that libertarians are determined to
resurrect the so-called "Constitution in Exile,"3 invoking
constitutional limits on federal power to regulate the economy
that have been dormant since the New Deal. But the likely
failure of the lawsuits shows how dramatically the probusiness conservatives have succeeded and the libertarian
conservatives have failed in their efforts to use arguments
about original understanding to transform the American legal
culture. "The legal precedent on striking down excessive
delegations is not exactly favorable," I was told by Robert
Levy, chairman of the CATO Institute. "I can't identify even
a minimal possibility that a commerce clause challenge would
succeed." Although the libertarians had some success in the
1990s, when states' rights conservatives like Sandra Day
O'Connor and William Rehnquist waved the banner of
federalism, they have only a single possible vote on the
Supreme Court today: Justice Clarence Thomas. (The other
originalist on the Court, Antonin Scalia, is not a consistent
supporter of states' rights). In fact, the libertarian rout has
been apparent since the Gonzales v. Raich case in 2005, when
Justice Scalia joined a six-to-three Supreme Court decision
upholding Congress's power, under the commerce clause, to
ban the use of pot, even when states have approved its use for
medicinal purposes. 4 (Three states' rights conservativesThomas, O'Connor, and Rehnquist dissented; only Thomas
remains on the Court).
If the libertarian conservatives expect their lawsuits to
fail, the pro-business conservatives have been crowed with
remarkable success. All nine Justices on the Roberts Court
share, to varying degrees, a suspicion of "regulation by
litigation." About forty percent of the Court's docket is now
made up of business cases, up from thirty percent in recent
years, and seventy-nine percent of them are decided by
margins of seven-to-two or better. 5 But it may be useful to
12. Id.
13. See Rosen, supra note 2.
14. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33-43 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring).
15. See Michael Orey, The Supreme Court: Open for Business, BUS. WK.,
July 9, 2007, at 30; see generally Robin S. Conrad, The Roberts Court and the
Myth of a Pro-BusinessBias, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 997 (2009).
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distinguish among, or between, the 2006 and 2007 terms,
because it helps show some of the fissures in the pro-business
record.
The 2006 term was exceptionally good for American
business. The Chamber's litigation center filed briefs in
fifteen cases and won thirteen of them, the highest
percentage of victories in the center's thirty year history. 6
By contrast last term, the 2007 term was more mixed for the
Chamber, with seven victories, seven defeats, and one partial
victory.
If you break down the cases last term, however, of those
seven defeats, five of them were employment law cases. And
in employment, environmental, and labor case, liberals and
conservatives are more likely to divide along predictable
ideological lines, because they have firm commitments about
equality and the appropriate role of regulation in the
workplace.
In a public interview last year, I asked Justice Breyer
why the Court was so pro-business. Although he resisted the
suggestion, he did acknowledge that there might be a
difference between constitutional cases, where Justices have
strong preconceptions and philosophical commitments, and
more technical, statutory cases, where they are more openminded and amenable to argument. If that observation is
correct, as I think it is, it may explain why in some cases of
interest to the business community-environmental,
employment, and labor law cases-there are other strong
commitments-the
commitment to equality in the
employment cases or to the environment or to labor-that
may trump the free market orientation that is shared by
liberal and conservative Justices in other business cases.
If you leave out the environment, labor, and employment
cases, and look at the remaining forty-six business cases
before the Roberts Court in which the Chamber participated,
most of them go the Chamber's way, in areas ranging from
punitive damages, preemption, false claims acts, securities
suits, private, and antitrust cases.
Richard Lazarus'
statistics help further to illustrate how successful the

16. Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme
Court, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1555 (2008).
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Chamber has been.17 The Court currently accepts less than
two percent of the petitions it receives every year in the
absence of amicus support;1 8 the Chamber of Commerce's
petitions between 2004-07 were granted at the rate of
twenty-six percent. Lazarus found that the Court reverses
the lower court in sixty-five percent of the cases it agrees to
hear when the petitioner is represented by elite Supreme
Court practitioners; 19 often working with the Chamber, the
success rate is seventy-five percent. For that reason, I think
the broad claim that this is a pro-business Court is hard to
dispute.
Some see the consensus in most of these business cases
as evidence that the Court can't be ideologically biased in
business cases. Professor Adler, in a response to Professor
Chemerinsky, 2° said, accurately I think, this is no pre-New
Deal Court.2 1 "Nor is the Court's apparent solicitude for
business concerns particularly rigid or ideological. To the
contrary, the results in most business law cases are lopsided,
'22
and rarely the result of an ideological division on the Court.
But this seems precisely the point. Consensus doesn't prove
that the Court isn't biased. It just shows that the traditional
liberal-conservative splits in culture war issues don't carry on
into business issues. There is an ideological bias on the
Court; it's just that all the Justices share the basic ideology
when it comes to markets and regulation.
Why have the pro-business conservatives been so
successful, while the libertarians have petered out? The most
obvious reason: there is no economic populist on the current
Supreme Court-no justice in the tradition of William 0.
Douglas, who once boasted that he was eager to use the law
to bend the law against the corporations and in favor of the
environment.2 3 And it's not a coincidence that there's no
economic populist on the Court. That reflects changes in the
17. See generally id.
18. Id. at 1528-29.
19. Id. at 1540.
20. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court at Age Three, 54 WAYNE L.
REV. 947 (2008) (observing a pro-business orientation on the Roberts Court).
21. Jonathan H. Adler, Getting the Roberts Court Right: A Response to
Chemerinsky, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 983 (2008).
22. Id.
23. BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, WILD BILL: THE LEGEND AND LIFE OF WILLIAM

0. DOUGLAS 455 (2003).
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legal culture, as well as the energetic efforts of the Chamber
of Commerce and other groups to lobby for the appointment of
free market liberals and conservatives rather than economic
populists or states rights conservatives.
In each of these categories, of course, you find liberal and
conservative examples.
There are liberal and more
conservative economic populists, for example, such as William
0. Douglas and Hugo Black.
Similarly, states rights
libertarians appear on both sides of the political spectrum.
Brandeis and O'Connor both opposed federal regulation and
thought most economic regulation should be anchored at the
state level. And you can have liberal and conservative freemarket nationalists, ranging from Breyer to Roberts.
The Chamber of Commerce was bipartisan in its lobbying
efforts, and said that it would work with democrats as well as
republicans in arguing for the appointment of pro-business
nationalists at every turn. And the Chamber was successful
in this effort, encouraging the appointment of Justices such
as Breyer, Roberts, and Alito, rather than states rights
enthusiasts like Thomas.
Both Roberts and Alito have
fulfilled the Chamber's hopes.
They're not committed
originalists; they don't have a states rights ideology, and are
both more interested in supporting national power than
limiting it.
We've heard Mitchell Pickerill's interesting
statistics showing that Roberts and Alito vote for the federal
government over the states more frequently than O'Connor
and Rehnquist.24 We heard David Franklin's statistics about
how the Justices most likely to vote against preemption were
Stevens followed by Thomas. 25 Bradley Joondeph has noted
that the "federalism five" are fifteen percent more likely to
vote for federal preemption than the liberal dissenters in
federalism cases.2 6 And finally, Vikram Amar has reminded
us that Roberts and Alito just don't buy into Scalia and
24. See generally Mitchell Pickerill, Something Old, Something New,
Something Borrowed, Something Blue, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1063 (2009).
25. See generally David L. Franklin, What Kind of Business-Friendly Court?
Explaining the Chamber of Commerce's Success at the Roberts Court, 49 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 1019 (2009).

26. See Bradley W. Joondeph, Federalism, the Rehnquist Court, and the
Modern Republican Party, 87 OR. L. REV. 117, 143 (2008) ("Rehnquist,
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas were much more ambivalent about
state autonomy ... as a group they were substantially less likely than their four
remaining colleagues to vote for the result that favored state autonomy.").
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Thomas' opposition to punitive damages.27
The differences between Roberts and Alito, the
nationalists, and Thomas and (to a much less consistent
degree) Scalia, the originalist federalists, are obvious.
Consider cases involving the dormant commerce clause. Alito
has shown that he very much wants to use it as a tool to
Scalia and Thomas, the
strike down state legislation.
sometimes states' righters, think the doctrine is bunk.
Roberts seems ambivalent, and Kennedy, the nationalist, is
Roberts and Alito are
more likely to side with Alito.
movement conservatives, like Scalia and Thomas, but they
come from a different wing of the movement than their
originalist colleagues.
It's worth noting that the libertarians and the probusiness conservative wings were originally more closely
matched than they are today. Like most commentators,
Steven M. Teles, in the Rise of the Conservative Legal
Movement,28 traces the movement back to Lewis Powell's
memorandum in 1971, when he expressed concern about
Ralph Nader's success in mobilizing liberal public interest
groups on behalf of a broad attack, as he called it, against the
American economic system. 29 To counteract the effect of
Nader and his colleagues, Powell urged the Chamber of
Commerce to begin a multi-front lobbying campaign on behalf
of business interests, noting that "the judiciary may be the
most important instrument for social, economic and political
change."" Six years later, the National Chamber Litigation
Center filed briefs on behalf of business interests in federal
and state court.
Teles argues that the libertarians were more successful
than their pro-business colleagues, because conservative
were initially funded
interest organizations
public

27. Vikram David Amar, Business and Constitutional Originalism in the
Roberts Court, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 979 (2009).
28. STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT:
THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAw (2008).

29. Id. at 61-62; Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Eugene B.
Sydnor Jr., Chairman, Educ. Comm., U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Aug. 23,
1971), availableat http://www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt/personality/sources-d
ocumentl3.html.
30. Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Eugene B. Sydnor Jr.,
Chairman, Educ. Comm., U.S. Chamber of Commerce, supra note 29.
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geographically, mostly by corporate interests."
At times,
these corporate interests clashed with the broad deregulatory
agenda of the true-believing libertarians.2
So the
libertarians regrouped, and during the 1980s, got more of
their funding
from
wealthy
individual
libertarian
entrepreneurs rather than from local Chambers of
Commerce. 3 As a result, they were able to start the Center
for Individual Rights, the Institute for Justice, and other
libertarian advocacy groups. 4
But Teles, I think,
underestimates the ways in which, unlike the National
Chamber Litigation Center, the libertarian groups have failed
in their broad ambition, which is to strike at the heart of the
post-New Deal regulatory state. They've had some success in
cases striking down affirmative action3 5 and restrictions on
interstate wine importation. 6
They've successfully
championed small entrepreneurs and small business, like
limo drivers in Las Vegas,3 African-American hair braiders
in San Diego," and casket sellers in Tennessee. 9
But as Scalia's defection to the nationalist side in
Gonzalez v. Raich4 0 shows, the broader project of resurrecting
a pre-New Deal understanding of limits on federal power has
failed. And Scalia's defection, as well as the failure of the
broader libertarian project, was foreshadowed as early as
1984 by a debate at the Cato Institute between Scalia and
31. TELES, supra note 28, at 58; see generally id. 62-64.
32. Id. at 65-66.
33. Id. at 227-28.
34. Id. at 222, 238-40.
35. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (striking down the
University of Michigan's
undergraduate admissions
system, which
automatically gave a twenty "point" advantage to minority applicants). But see
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding the University of
Michigan's law school admissions process, which considered the race of
applicants, but only as a "plus" factor narrowly tailored to improving student
body diversity).
36. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005).
37. See Institute for Justice, IJ Wins Court Victory Vindicating Economic
Liberty for Las Vegas Limo Operators, http://www.ij.org/index.php?option=com
content&task=view&id=775&Itemid=165 (last visited Apr. 4, 2009).
38. Cornwell v. Cal. Bd. of Barbering and Cosmetology, 962 F. Supp. 1260
(S.D. Cal. 1997).
39. Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002).
40. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 35 (2005) ("Where necessary to make a
regulation of interstate commerce effective, Congress may regulate even those
intrastate activities that do not themselves substantially affect interstate
commerce.").
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Richard Epstein, the hero of the libertarians. At the debate,
Scalia, speaking first, defended the view that judges should
restrain themselves from overturning legislation in the name
of rights or liberties not clearly and expressly enumerated in
the Constitution. As a traditional federalist, he had his own
qualms about the constitutionality of unlimited federal
power, but he didn't like Roe v. Wade41 or Lochner v. New
York, 42 he didn't want to make up constitutional rights, and
he thought the Warren Court had been insufficiently
deferential to legislatures. This made Epstein's head explode.
He threw away his prepared remarks, spontaneously
attacked Scalia, and said that many statutes called out for a
quick and easy kill. Judges had to be more aggressive in
protecting economic liberties; and, he said unapologetically,
some movement in the direction of judicial activism is clearly
indicated.
It's striking to note how little success that call has had.
Epstein's libertarian vision was embraced most specifically in
Clarence Thomas' concurrence in the United States v. Lopez43
case (not only specifically but literally-some noted that some
passages seemed to be lifted directly from Epstein's famous
article on the proper limits of the commerce clause). 4 But the
majority of the Court as a whole has rejected the Epsteinian
and Thomas vision. As Arlen Specter said in John Roberts'
confirmation hearing, the Court itself recanted the
constitutional approach proclaimed in Lopez in the Gonzales
v. Raich case, which held that federal drug laws preempted
state laws legalizing medical marijuana. 4 When Justice
Stevens said that Congress'

commerce clause authority

includes the power to prohibit the local cultivation and use of
marijuana in compliance with California laws, he reaffirmed

41. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding a fundamental right in a
woman's choice to obtain an abortion).
42. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruled by W. Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (finding a fundamental right in the "freedom
to contract" and ushering the era of economic substantive due process, which
severely curtailed the government's power to regulate economic activity until
repudiated by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish).
43. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
44. Richard A. Epstein, The ProperScope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L.
REV. 1387 (1987).
45. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
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Wickard v. Filburn,4 6 the boogey-man of Thomas and Epstein,
and drove a stake through the heart of the most enthusiastic
hopes of the libertarian-originalists. Another mortal blow to
the libertarians was the Kelo v. City of New London case,
which suggested there's no majority on the current Court for
using doctrines like the takings clause to limit federal or state
regulations in an aggressive way.47
Roberts and Alito seem comfortable with the post New
Deal settlement, and don't seem interested in resurrecting
the non-delegation doctrine, or limits on the commerce clause,
to pursue a deregulatory agenda. As a result, most of the probusiness activity of the Roberts Court has been in the
statutory arena. And that's relevant not only, as Breyer
suggests, because it's easier to get some kind of consensus in
cases that don't engage the passions of the Justices as much,
but also because there's less of an instinctive suspicion to
creative, deregulatory statutory arguments among traditional
conservatives like Scalia, who retain vestigial suspicion of
substantive due process.
Might anything change the general pro-business
orientation of the Roberts Court? I'll be interested to watch
the role of the solicitor general. One theory is that the
Roberts Court isn't really pro-business or pro-employee at all,
but that most of its decisions for and against business can be
reconciled by a single unifying factor: the position of the
solicitor general. Justice Breyer believes in deference to
executive agencies, for example, and he may have been moved
by the Bush administration's briefs on behalf of federal
preemption. Of course, it's hardly clear that General Elena
Kagan will take a dramatically different position in business
cases than Generals Ted Olson, Paul Clement, and Gregory
Garre. She is hardly an economic populist, and has defended
the powers of the unitary executive before the conservatives
dramatically expanded that theory.48
What about future Obama nominees to the Supreme
46. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding the federal
government's commerce power to regulate the production of wheat grown
entirely for private consumption and never entering interstate commerce).
47. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (upholding the use of
eminent domain to transfer land from one private owner to another for purposes
of economic development).
48. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245
(2001).
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Court? Can we imagine that the president will appoint the
first economic populist since William 0. Douglas? Some of his
rhetoric should be encouraging to people with a populist
inclination. He said that he wants a Justice who will favor
the powerless rather than the powerful, 49 and that his model
is Earl Warren, 5° who understood the practical effects of
Supreme Court decisions on ordinary Americans. He believes
that the current Court favors the powerful at the expense of
the powerless."' Nevertheless, his most frequently vetted
nominees include candidates such as Kagan and Cass
Sunstein who, despite their many virtues, cannot be
described as economic populists. For this reason, although
Obama may be drawn to the economic populist tradition, it's
hardly obvious that he will appoint a justice from that
tradition. The legal culture has changed too dramatically,
especially in the academy, and there are few William 0.
Douglases waiting in the wings.
That leads to my final question. Will the changed
political zeitgeist in light of the economic collapse make
economic populism more fashionable, and cause liberals and
conservatives on the Court to question their pro-free market
orientation? Skepticism of regulation by litigation may be
less fashionable now that even Alan Greenspan has said that
he is shocked by the excesses of the market.52 A recent study
showed that securities lawsuits are up seventy percent from
two years ago.53
Will the Supreme Court, which often
responds to winds of change, include less rhetoric in its
opinions about the high cost of litigation?
Only Justice Kennedy knows. But, as the Chamber of
Commerce shows, it's possible enthusiastically to support
regulation by legislation-such as the TARP and the stimulus
bill-and still oppose regulation by litigation. And even in
the most challenging economic circumstances, it's hard to
49. David G. Savage, Two Visions of the Supreme Court, L.A. TIMES, May
18, 2008, at A8.

50. Id.
51. Id.

52. Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Flaws in Deregulatory
Approach, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2008, at B1.
53. ELLEN M. RYAN & LAURA E. SIMMONS, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH,
SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETrLEMENTS: 2008 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 4 (2009),

available at http://securities.stanford.edu/Settlements/REVIEW_1995-2008/Sett
lementsThrough_12_2008.pdf.
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imagine Justice Kennedy transforming himself into a firebreathing William 0. Douglas.
For this reason, the
organizers of this symposium have performed a great service
by calling our attention to the pro-business (but nonlibertarian) orientation of the Robert Court, an orientation
that is likely to continue for decades to come.

